Introduction 1
Since 1960s, the United States has quickly become one of the largest importers of textile 2 and apparel (T&A) in the world (Dickerson, 1999) . In 2009, U.S. textile and apparel imports 3 totaled $17.90 billion and $63.10 billion respectively, which were nearly four times as much as 4 the import volume in 1990 (OTEXA, 2010) . Concurrent with the quick increase of imports, the 5 U.S. domestic T&A industries suffered from steady reduction of output and great loss of 6 employment, especially for those manufacturing-concentrated functions (Abernathy, Volpe, & 7 Weil, 2006) . Understandably, imports were largely blamed for causing the difficult situation of 8 the U.S. T&A industries (Nordas, 2004) . More specifically, the rising import penetration ratio 9 (IPR)-the percentage of domestic apparent consumption supplied by imports (Morgan, 1988 , p. 10 13), was often identified as the threatening and disruptive factor to the survival of the U.S. 11 domestic textile and apparel firms (Krueger, 1996) . 12
However, one important aspect of the story often overlooked is the dramatic restructuring 13 process that has occurred in the U.S. T&A industries in response to globalization. For example, 14 after abandoning most of the domestic production capacity in favor of outsourcing, U.S. apparel 15 firms have established solid business relationships with apparel exporting countries, either 16 through cut-and-sew contracts, opening and owning plants, or full package sourcing ( as well as the elimination of the quota system have also enabled the U.S. textile industry to form 19 much closer ties with business partners outside the U.S. borders and to take greater advantage of 20 resources on a global basis (Gereffi,1999) . 21
Capturing the relationship between import penetration and the operation of the U.S. T&A 22 industries in the globalized era is of value both to academia and government policy making. For 23 industries, particularly as to how the adoption of various restructuring strategies fundamentally 25 transformed the way the industry functions in more developed economies. If a non-competing 26 relationship different from the traditional view is suggested by the findings, it may call for 27 rethinking the conclusions of many existing theories built upon old paradigms when 28 globalization was far less influential in depth and in breadth. On the other hand, for policymakers, 29 such relationship matters to the appropriateness of trade and industrial policies intended to create 30 a favored environment for the U.S. domestic T&A industries. In particular, trade restrictions 31 stemmed from grave concerns about the negative impacts of import penetration. This perspective 32 dominated U.S. textile trade policy for decades, resulting in the creation and implementation of 33 various policy tools for the purpose of trade restriction (Dickerson, 1988) . However, if imports 34 no longer pose a threat to the survival of the domestic industry, but rather the two have become 35 "partners," then a fundamental shift in the direction of policy might be suggested. 36
Although some studies have been conducted on related topics, research gaps still exist. For 37 example, some studies either focused on the patterns of U.S. T&A imports (such as Nordas, 38 2004) Second, many U.S. textile firms enlarged production capacity through mergers and 119 acquisitions (M&A) with the main purposes of taking advantage of economies of scale and 120 achieving lower production cost (Mock, 2002) . The adoption of the M&A strategy may explain 121 why large firms remain a good proportion in the U.S. textile industry despite the overall decline 122 of the total number of firms (Christoffersen et al., 2004) . Empirical studies further suggested that 123 plants that survived in the U.S. textile industry emerged with stronger competitiveness while 124 those that exited were comparatively less productive (Chi, Kilduff, & Dyer, 2009) . 125
Third, the U.S. textile mills improved supply chain management. As customers' demands for 126 apparel products have become more volatile and unpredictable with a shorter life cycle, textile 127 production is expected to be more "sensitive" to quick market changes (Christopher, Lowson & 128 Peck, 2004) . Two main categories of strategies have been widely adopted in the U.S. textile 129 industry: one category is lean supply with the goal of reducing inventories and shortening the 130 delivery time, and the other is agile supply which intends to deliver the products more 131 "efficiently" by making the high volatility products available to the customers (Oh & Kim, 132 2007). Specific supply chain management strategies commonly applied by the U.S. textile 133 industry include quick response (QR), automatic replenishment, just-in-time (JIT) systems, point 134 of sale information, and mass customization (Oh & Kim, 2007) . 135
Fourth, the U.S. textile industry actively engaged in the building of regional production 136 networks with countries that are geographically close to the United States. This strategy received 137 strong support from U.S. trade policymakers by intentionally adding special provisions 138 reached with trading partners (Gereffi, Spener & Bair, 2002 Compared with the U.S. textile industry, the U.S. apparel industry had a more difficult 146 time facing the flood of imports coming from the low-wage countries. High domestic production 147 cost, especially labor, is regarded as one of the greatest disadvantages for the U.S. apparel 148 industry to compete on price (Gereffi et al., 2002) . On the other hand, contrary to the case in the 149 textile industry, the nature of apparel manufacturing makes it quite difficult to incorporate 150 automation (Dickerson, 1999) . 151
Over time as retailers bought increasing quantities of low cost imports, the fierce 152 competition caused the U.S. apparel industry to abandon most of the domestic production 153 capacity in favor of outsourcing and offshore sub-contracting (Kim & Rucker, 2005) . Gereffi et 154 al. (2002) proposed that two types of apparel firms emerged quickly in the industry: one is 155 "marketers," which are engaged in design and marketing activities and characterized as 156 manufacturers without factories (such as Liz Claiborne (prior to name change) and Ralph 157 Lauren). The other type is "branded manufacturers" which still deal with activities ranging from 158 design, cutting, assembly, laundry to marketing (such as Levi Strauss and VF Corporation). 159
However, the key role of "branded manufacturers" is to organize and oversee the whole 160 production process rather than simply manufacture by themselves (Gereffi et al., 2002) . Overmanufacturers," or other types that emerge, their operations are based on the close contracting 163 networks with overseas companies, especially manufacturers in the less-developed countries. 164
These transformed U.S. apparel firms did not regard imports as competitors. Quite the opposite, 165 a large portion of U.S. apparel imports actually were arranged by "marketers" and "branded 166
manufacturers." 167
Ironically, U.S. retailers became the emerging competitors for U.S. apparel firms. Although 168 retailers were the customers of apparel firms, they became ambitious in establishing their own 169 sourcing network so as to shorten the lead time, reduce the sourcing cost, and enhance their 170 margins (Gereffi et al., 2002; Dickerson, 1999) . At the same time, some large-scale-U.S. apparel 171 firms, including branded manufacturers have also extended their business realm into the retailing 172 sector by means of forward integration (Kilduff, 2005) . The phenomenon of "scrambled 173 softgoods chain" within which some traditional steps in the supply-chain are skipped may also be 174 found in the U.S. apparel industry (Dickerson, 1999) . 175
On the other hand, although imported apparel through sourcing networks has played a 176 dominant role in supplying the U.S. apparel market, the U.S. apparel industry still maintains 177 certain local production bases, such as in New York and Los Angeles (Bailey-Todd, Eckman, & 178
Tremblay, 2008). Compared with imports which target the mass market and achieve profits on 179 high volumes, this locally produced apparel, in most cases, serve a U.S. niche market. They cater 180 to particular needs from the retail customers on quality and flexibility and compete mostly on 181 non-price factors, such as design and service (Parrish et al., 2006) . 182 largely replaced by offshore production and outsourcing (Kilduff, 2005) . Under the new business 204 model, on one hand, a good proportion of imports were brought into the U.S. market by the U.S. 205 apparel firms themselves, whose commercial success was heavily dependent on the efficient 206 cooperation with contracted apparel manufacturers overseas. On the other hand, as the 207 instead of competitors, the rising import level reflected by a higher import penetration ratio may 209 no longer imply the U.S. apparel industry "lost" in competing with imports. Although certain 210 domestic apparel manufacturing capacity remained in the United States, in most cases these 211 operations fulfill the needs of the niche market and are supplementary to the imports which 212 basically serve the mass consumer markets (Gereffi, 2001) . As the nature of the game has largely 213 changed from zero-sum competition into cooperation, operation of the restructured U.S. apparel 214 industry shall not be negatively affected by rising imports. Therefore, the study proposes: 215 
A λ denotes total factor productivity which 231 changes over time; K and L respectively represents capital and labor input with output elasticity 232 at α and β .
233
To maximize profit, marginal revenue product of labor (MPL) of industry i in period t shall 234 equal its wage ( it W ) level and marginal revenue product of capital (MPK) shall equal rent ( it C ). 235
As most concerns for the impacts of import competition are concentrated on the labor side, K is 236 further expressed as a function of parameter L, W and C, so that s it Q will be directly dependent 237 on employment and wage level. By solving equations simultaneously, we get 238
Third, in term of the behavior of U.S. total domestic demand for industry i in period t , ( 1 to imports in the U.S. market. As productivity is positively associated with the supply of 254 U.S.-made T&A, when imports directly compete with U.S. product, productivity growth 255 will result in the rising market share of U.S. domestic products. Therefore, we expect 256 φ can reveal whether IPR has any 287 structural changes in the post-quota era due to the significant changes of the" rules of game." 288 Another variable is t, which is used to capture the potential time trend that existed in the data. 289
Failing to control the time trend may result in a spurious regression problem (Wooldridge, 2002) , 290 especially when time-series data are not stationary. 291
Besides, i c refers to the possible unobserved sectoral effect and it µ denotes error terms.
292
Because of the interconnection between the textile industry and the apparel industry, simplyestimation of parameters due to the correlation among it µ for different textile and apparel subsectors (Wooldridge, 2002) . 296
To achieve unbiased and consistent estimation, the panel data modeling technique is 297 adopted in this study, which is specifically developed to tackle a dataset involving both cross-298 sectional and time-series data. Compared to the traditional cross-sectional regression, a panel 299 data model can help solve the potential problem of cross-sectional heteroskedasticity in the 300 dataset and reveal the potential dynamics in the dataset which cannot be detected by the cross-301 sectional regression (Wooldridge, 2002) . Moreover, the generalized least square (GLS) method 302 instead of pooled ordinary least square (POLS), is used to ensure consistent and efficient 303 estimation of the parameters. GLS has the advantages of tolerating a certain degree of correlation 304 among independent variables (Wooldridge, 2002) . This is particularly useful in this study given 305 the linkage among productivity, wage level and employment size in Equation 3. 306
Data Source 307
Data used in this study came from various U.S. government agencies, which are the best 308 sources available for official national-level aggregated industry and trade statistics. Except for 309 otherwise noted, all data were collected at the 4-digit NAICS code level 1 , so as to make industry 310 performance and trade activities compatible with each other. More specifically: 311 
For import penetration ratio (variable IPR ), volumes of imports for each 4-digit NAICS
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Relationship Between Imports and the U.S. imply that expansion of the workforce in the U.S. textile industry will not help the U.S. textile 368 industry gain more market share in the domestic market, but rather will end up with more 369 imports. Moreover, the estimated parameter for the dummy variable quota is not statistically 370 significant, suggesting that impact of the quota elimination did not lead to changes of the import 371 penetration level in the U.S. textile industry as a whole. 372 Second, statistical insignificance of the empirical results could also attribute to the fact that 414 multiple parties in the U.S. softgoods industry are involved in importing apparel. In particular, it 415 has become a common practice for large apparel retailers in the United States to set up 416 departments solely responsible for global sourcing of an increasing share of private-label 417 products in their total sales (Dickerson, 1999) . However, under the NAICS system, apparel 418 retailers (NAICS 448) and apparel firms (NAICS 315) were classified separately, which means 419 their industry activities such as output, productivity and employment were independently 420 collected and released. Unfortunately retailers' participation in international trade currently is 421 not traced and reported by official statistical sources. Since apparel imports sourced by retailers 422 have reached a sizable scale but cannot be separated from total import volumes, it unavoidably 423 weakens the sensitivity of data in reflecting the actual linkage between imports and the operation 424 of the U.S. apparel industry (NAICS 315). 425
Third, the diversity of apparel products may further complicate the empirical estimation of 426 the relationship between imports and the operation of the U.S. domestic firms. In contrast to the 427 highly standardized textiles products such as fiber, yarn and fabric, apparel products are more 428 different sources have demonstrated a wide range of average price measured by dollars per 430 square meters (SME). Some studies already argue that origin of imports matters for their impact 431 on an importing country's domestic industries (Bernard, Jensen, & Schott, 2006) . Similarly, the 432 proposed cooperation between imports and the operation of the U.S. apparel industry could be 433 more remarkable if empirical tests were narrowed down to a smaller group of apparel firms and 434 imports from certain geographic regions. 435
436
Conclusions and Implications 437
This study empirically evaluated the relationship between import penetration and the 438 operation of the U.S. textile and apparel industries by using a panel data model based on data at Instead, a more comprehensive and objective assessment of the conditions of the U.S. textile and 466 apparel industries should also take aspects such as product structure, productivity growth, 467 demand for occupations at different skill levels and export dependency rate into consideration. 468
Overall, it is important to keep in mind that both the U.S. textile and apparel industries today are 469 but a shadow of what they were even a decade ago. However, the two industries have survived 470 through strategic transformation and are expected to continue development in the future. 471
Second, findings of this study raise questions on whether there is a basis to be nervous 472 about rising imports, especially in the context of an integrated global economy in which global 473 fragmented production and trade networks predominate. Actually, the validity of arguments 474 and output of importer's domestic industry necessarily constitute a "zero-sum" game. However, 476 this assumption is questionable when international trade in an integrated global economy today is 477 no longer arm's-length transaction in nature (Cattaneo, Gereffi & Staritz, 2010) . Findings of this 478 study also pose challenges to the "zero-sum" game assumption. The suggested non-competing 479 relationship implies that not only has the U.S. apparel industry extensively incorporated imports 480 into its global-based operation, but also the U.S. textile industry may benefit from imports and 481 offshore production, although the detailed mechanism needs further exploration. shows that with the adoption of various restructuring strategies, maintaining today's U.S. textile 489 and apparel industries largely depend on the free flow of goods and services across the borders. 490
Even if imports were restricted, those lost jobs-mostly low-skill types, would not simply go 491 back to the United States as wished. Instead, with the rising dependency on markets outside the 492 U.S. border, perhaps policymakers should more wisely spend precious policy resources to 493 strengthen the competiveness of U.S. textiles and apparel products in the global marketplace 494 which is of growing importance to the industries' future prosperity. 495
Despite the interesting and meaningful results of the findings, several changes might be 496 made to further improve the quality of the future similar studies. First, it could be better if longerof the estimation by increasing the number of data points and degrees of freedom for the model. 499
However, cautions should also be given to the possible new "noises" brought in with data from a 500 longer time span. For example, if data prior than 2002 were used in the model, questions arise on 501 how to deal with China's WTO accession effect as well as the correspondence of NAICS with 502 the SIC system because categories changed. Second, it could be improved if empirical tests can 503 be conducted at even more disaggregated data level. Particularly, the heterogeneity of different 504 sub-sectors within the textile and apparel industries might also cause the insignificance of the 505 estimation results. Third, the study might be improved if the interactions between the textile 506 industry and the apparel industry can be taken into consideration. In this study, the relationship 507 between imports and the operation of the U.S. textile and apparel industries were evaluated based 508 on products within the same NAICS-code sector, while future study may take cross-sector 509 connections into consideration. Last but not least, structure of the empirical model can be further 510 improved by taking the potential existence of stochastic trends in the dataset into consideration. 511
With the presence of stochastic trends, the dataset will be non-stationary and may lead to biased 512 estimation even when time trend variable t is included in the model. As one solution, the Dickey-513
Fuller test or related tools may be used in the future to detect the potential existence of stochastic 514
trends. 515
Note 516
1. In this study, the U.S. textile industry covers NAICS 3131 (Fiber, yarn and thread), NAICS 517 3132 (Fabrics) and NAICS 3133 (Fabric finishing and coating); the U.S. apparel industry 518 covers NAICs 3151 (Knitted apparel), NAICs 3152 (Cut and sew apparel) and NAICS3159 519 (Apparel accessories). 520 exert more significant impact on the country structure of import sources rather than the 522 overall import volume which is more closely related to macro economic conditions (Nordas, 523 2004) . Second, the largest textile and apparel exporter to the United States-China, was still 524 subject to quota restriction for many of its most competitive products until the end of 2008. 525 3. Under the Berry Amendment, clothing, fabrics, fibers, yarns or other made-up textiles 526 procured by the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) need to be 100% made in the United 527
States (U.S. Department of Defense, 2011). 528 
